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terms, the extent of an easement acquired by prescription is governed
by the clharacter and the extent of the user during the prescriptive
period plus reasonable deviations in degree but not in character, from
the original user, so long as such deviations do not impose a ma-
terially greater burden upon the servient estate.
In the determination of whether or not the dominant owner has
exceeded his rightful use of a prescriptive easement, we are not aided
by the distinctions between character, or nature, and degree, of the use.
This is due largely to the fact that we are unable to reach any satis-
factory working definitions of these terms. Apparently the courts
merely say that an excessive use is a deviation in character or a devia-
tion in degree. As an example of the arbitrariness of the courts in this
matter, let us compare Atwater v. Bodfish, supra, and Parks v. Bishop,
supra. In the former, carrying products from cultivated land was held
to be a deviation in character from the original use of carrying wood
from the same land when it was in an uncultivated state. In the
latter, using the dominant estate for a storehouse and for a manu-
factory, where formerly it was used as a paint shop, a carriage shop,
and a blacksmith shop, was held to be, not a deviation in character,
but a change in the degree of the use. The writer is of the opinion that
the real distinction between these two cases is that in the former a
materially greater burden was imposed on the servient estate, whereas
in the later case the added burden to the servient estate was not ma-
trially greater.
Thus it is submitted that the proper method of handling the
problem of the extent of a prescriptive easement-a method which
will reach the same results as have the courts-is to hold that the
user acquired is governed by the prescriptive user, plus reasonable
deviations therefrom, as long as such deviations do not impose a ma-
terially greater burden upon the servient estate.
WUXIAM IELLOn.
EVIDENCE-CMPETENCY or HUSBAND AsM W=ix.
The recent case of Funk v. U. S., 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (1933), considers
the problem of the common law disqualification of husband and wife-
to testify for or against the other in criminal cases. In that case the
petitioner had twice been tried and convicted in a Federal District
Court upon an indictment for conspiracy to violate the National Pro-
hibition Act. The case reached the Supreme Court by the grant of a
writ of certiorari which was limited to the question as to what law
was applicable to the determination of the competency of the wife of
the petitioner as a witness in his behalf. The court, in reversing the
conviction meted out by the District Court and ruling that the wife
was a competent witness in her husband's behalf, said: "a refusal to
permit the wife, upon the ground of interest, to testify in behalf of
her husband, while permitting him, who has the greater interest, to,
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testify for himself, presents a manifest incongruity." In making this
departure from the usual line of decisions, Sutherland, J., who de-
livered the opinion, remarked: "The public policy of one generation
may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another."
At common law, and under some statutes, husband and wife are
incompetent as witnesses for or against each other in either civil or
criminal proceedings. Barron v. Anniston, 157 Ala. 899, 48 So. 58
(1908); Reaves v. Coffman, 87 Ark. 60, 112 S. W. 194 (1908); Lucas
v. State, 23 Conn. 18 (1854); State v. Smith, 5 Pennew. 1, 57 Atl. 368
(1904); Bx. p. Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685 (1909); Stanford v.
Murphy, 63 Ga. 410 (1879); Schreffler v. Chase, 245 Ill. 395, 92 N. E.
272 (1910); Copeland v. State, 60 Ind. 394 (1878); Karney v. Paisley,
13 Iowa 89 (1862); Jenkins v. Lewis, 25 Kan. 332 (1881); Allen v.
Commonwealth, 134 Ky. 110, 119 S. W. 795 (1909); State v. Pain, 48
La. Ann, 311, 19 So. 138 (1896); Burlen v. Shannon, 14 Gay 433 (1860);
Finklea v. -State, 94 Miss. 777, 48 So. 1 (1909); State v. Willis, 119 Mo.
485, 24 S. W. 1008 (1894); Blain v. Patterson, 47 N. H. 523 (1867);
Bird v. Davis, 14 N. J. Eq. 467 (1862); Wilke v. People, 53 N. Y. 525
(1873); Anonymous, 3 N. C. 127 (1800); Schultz v. State, 32 Ohio St.
276 (1877); Nix v. Gilner, 5 Okla. 740, 50 Pac. 131 (1897); Canole v.
Allen, 222 Pa. St. 156, 70 Atl. 1053 (1908); Briggs v. Titus, 7 R. I. 441
(1863); Hyden v. Hyden, 6 Baxt. 406 (1873); Simpson v. Brotherton,
62 Tex. 170 (1884); Boyce v. Bolster, 79 Vt. 40, 64 Atl. 79 (1906);
Bowman v. Reinhardt, 89 Va. 435, 16 S. E. 279 (1892); Grabowski v.
State, 126 Wis. 447, 105 N. W. 805 (1905).
The disqualification of husband and wife seems to have been
recognized in the common law from the time of Lord Coke, 1 Wigmore,
Evidence (2d. ed., 1923), Sec. 600; 4 ibid., Sec. 2247. Certain exceptions
were recognized by reason of necessity, such as crimes of personal
violence by the husband against the wife. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d
ed., 1923), Sec. 612; 4 ibid., See. 2239. Dean Wigmore states the com-
mon law view in the light of a distinction between a privilege of one
spouse not to testify against the other, and absolute incompetency in
either situation. 33 Harv. L. Rev. 873 (1920).
From 1840 to 1870 legislation by degrees removed the disqualifica-
tion in England and the United States, though in the latter jurisdictions
the process was tediously slow. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed., 1923),
Sec. 602; 5 ibid., See. 2333. The rule is, at this time, considerably
modified by statutes making the husband and wife competent to testify
for or against each other in some, although not in all, instances.
Thomas v. State, 155 Ala. 125, 46 So. 771 (1908); Fitzgerald v. Liver-
more, 13 Pac. 167 (1887); Rivers, v. State, 118 Ga..42, 44 S. E. 859;
Larson v. Carter, 14 Idaho 511, 94 Pac. 825 (1908); Johnson v. Mc-
Gregor, 157 Il1. 350, 41 N. E. (1895); Hutchason v. State, 67' Ind. 449
(1879); Auchanpaugh v. Schmidt, 77 Iowa 13 (1889); Smith v.
Doherty, 109 Ky. 616, 60 S. W. 380 (1901); Martin v. Derenbecker, 116
La. 495, 40 So. 849 (1906); Fowler v. Tidd, 15 Gray 94 (1860); O'Toole
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v. Ohio German F. Ins. Co., 159 Mich. 187, 123 N. W. 795 (1909);
Virden v. Dwyer, 78 Miss. 763, 30 So. 45 (1901); Brown v. Patterson,
224 Mo. 639, 124 S. W. 1 (1909); Lihs v. ALhs, 44 Neb. 143; 62 N. W.
457 (1895); People v. Public Charities Comrs., 9 Hun. 212 (1876);
Westerman v. Westerman, 25 Ohio St. 500 (1874); Canole v. Allen, 222
Pa. St. 156, 70 Atl. 1053. (1908); Orr v. Cox, 3 Lea. 617 (1879); Steve&
v. Smith, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 126, 107 S. W. 141 (1908); Crowder v.
Garber, 97 Va. 565; 34 S. E. 470 (1899); Jefferson First Nat. Bank v.
Harris, 56 W. Va. 345, 49 S. E. 252 (1904).
The statutes in these jurisdictions usually make the following ex-
ceptions to the common law rule of disqualification: (1) -where the
spouse offered as a witness is also a party to the action; (2) where
the trial concerns the separate estate of the wife; (3) where the wife,
if unmarried, would be a plaintiff or defendant in the action; and
(4) where the transaction in Issue was alleged to have been conducted
by the wife as agent for the husband. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.,
1923), See. 613.
In a few states the relationship of husband and wife has no effect
on the competency of a witness; Ilx. p. Belville, 58 Fla.* 170,. 50 So. 685
(1909); State v. McCord, 8 Kan. 232, 12 Am. Rep. 469 (1871); !lhom,
son v. Wardleigh, 48 Me. 66 (1861); Richardson v. State, 103 Md. 112,
63 Atl. 317 (1906); Matteson v. N. Y. Cent. By. Co., 62 Barb. 364
(1862); State v. Reynolds, 48 S. C. 384, 26 S. E. 679 (1897); Guillaume
v. Flannery, 21 S.D. 1, 108 N. W. 255 (1906), except as respects confi-
dential communications. Most of the states which abolished incom-
petency of the husband and wife retain the rule in the form of a
privilege as to testimony against the spouse, and 'all provide for
privilege as to confidential communications. 1 Wigmore, Evidence
(2d ed., 1923), Secs. 448, 620.
The common law rule still obtains except as modified or abrogated
by express statutes. Haworth v. Norris, 28 Fla. 763, 10 So. 18 (1891);
Phares v. Barbour, 49 Ill. 370 (1868); Roberts v. Porter, 78 Ind. 130
(1881); Ward v. Dickson, 96 Iowa 708, 65 N. W. 997 (1896); T2urpin v.
State, 55 Md. 462 (1881); State v. Armstrong, 4 Minn. 251 (1860);
gBoward v. Brower, 37 Ohio St. 402 (1881); Paul v. Leavitt, 53 Mo. 595
(1873); Donnelly v. Smith, 7 R. 1. 12 (1861); Owen v. State, 89 Tenn.
698, 16 S. W. 114 (1891); Watkins v. Wortlan, 19 W. Va. 78 (1881);
Crawford v. State, 98 Wis. 623, 74 N. W. 537 (1898). Since the basis
of the rule was public policy, on the ground that to admit such testi-
mony would endanger the harmony and confidence of marital relations,
and, moreover, would subject the witness to the temptation to commit
perjury, statutes removing the disqualification arising from interest
do not remove the disqualification arising from the relationship of hus-
band and wife. Dawley v. Ayers, 23 Cal. 108 (1863); Haworth v. Norris,
28 Fla. 763, 10 So. 18 (1891); Mitchinson v. Gross, 58 Ill. 366 (1871);
Stanley v. Stanton, 36 Ind. 445 (1871); McKen v. Frost, 46 Me. 239
(1858); Kelley v. Drew, 12 Allen 107, 90 Am. Dec. 138 (1866); Young
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v. Gilman,.46 N. H. 484 (1866); Bird v. Davis, 14 N. J. Eq. 467 (1862);
White v. Stafford, 38 Barb. 41a (1862); Rice v. Keith, 63 N. C. 319
(1869); Steen v. State, 20 Ohio St. 333 (1870); Gee v. Scott, 48 Tex.
510, 26 Am. Rep. 331 (1878); Carpenter v. Moore, 43 Vt. 392 (1871);
Hill v. Proctor, 10 W. Va. 59 (1877).
The decisions in the federal courts with regard to this question,
-are, for the most part; inconsistent with the result reached in the case
at hand. The federal courts have, up to the present time, -followed the
decision in the leading case of Jin Fuey Moy v. U. S., 254 U. S. 189
(1920), which arbitrarily ruled that a wife was incompetent to testify
for her husband because of her interest in the event. Krashowitz v.
U. 5., 282 F. 599, 282 F. 601 (1922) ;U. S. v. Davidson, et al., 288 F. 662
(1922); Haddad v. U. S., 294 F. 536 (1923); Liberato v. U. S., 12
F. (2d) 564 (1926); U. S. v. Swiezbenski, 18 F. (2d) 688 (1927);
Barton, et al. v. U. S., 25 F (2d) 967 (1928); Fisher v. U. 5. 32 F. (2d)
604 (1929). The Jin Fuey Moy case was a prosecution for the viola-
tion of the Anti-Narcotic Act and the court in its opinion stated that
not only could the wife not testify in behalf of her husband to prove
his innocence, but also could not contradict the testimony of a certain
witness for the government who had testified to certain matters as
having transpired in his presence. The basic reason why the federal
,courts have up to the present time, adhered so closely to the old estab-
lished rule is aptly expressed in the case of Colston v. U. S., 51 F. (2d)
178 (1931), which said that in criminal cases, within the federal
courts, the competency of a witness is determined by the common law
of the particular jurisdiction as it existed when the state was admitted
to the Union. It necessarily follows that since at the time of admit-
tance to the union each state's common law provided for disqualifica-
tion of husband and wife, this rule would obtain in the federal courts
-established in those states.
Kentucky decisions seem to support the majority of the various
-state decisions to the effect that except for approximately six excep-
tions, the general rule of incompetency applies. Commonwealth v.
Woefel, 121 Ky. 48, 88 S. W. 1061 (1905); Joseph v. Commonwealth,
30 K. L. R. 638, 99 S. W. 311 (1907); Rultand v. Commonwealth, 160
Ky. 77, 169 S. W. 584 (1914); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 180,
169 S. W. 587 (1914); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 623, 243 S. W.
1 (1922); Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 229, 263 S. W. 752 (1924).
Kentucky Code, Sec. 606, provides that husband and wife are incom-
petent to testify for or against each other except (1) in an action for
lost baggage against a common carrier, innkeeper, or wrongdoer, or
(2) in an action which might have been brought by or against the
wife If she had been unmarried, or (3) when a husband or wife is
acting as agent for his or her consort, or (4) where the husband or
-wife is charged with the commission of a crime under Chapter 19,
p. 70 of the Acts of 1922 (Ky. Statutes, Sec. 331t-1), or (5) in a prose-
'cution for the crime of bigamy.
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In conclusion it may be noted that at the present time the various
privileges and disqualifications surrounding the testimony of husband
and wife are being diminished with surprising rapidity by frequent
code amendments and by judicial decisions. An entire abolition of these
privileges and disqualifications, of doubtful benefit, should be effected.
This will probably come about in time through judicial decisions since
flexibility aid capacity for growth are the peculiar boasts of the com-
mon law. Sutherland, J., aptly puts it when he says, "the fundamental
basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest-if they are to rest
upon reason-is their adaptation to the successful development of the
truth". And reason dictates that a rule of evidence, at one time
thought indispensable to an expedient ascertainment of the truth,
should yield to the experience of a new generation, if that experience
justifies the conclusion that the old rule is fallacious.
ALBERT R. JoNEs
AUTomoImEss-THE FAmnImy PuRpos DOCTRINE IN KENTUcKy.
The Kentucky court has uniformly upheld the family purpose doc-
trine from the beginning of its adjudication in this state, either by
actual decision or by dictum. Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 388, 144 S. W.
62 (1912); Miller v. Week, 186 Ky. 552, 217 S. W. 904 (1920); Holland
v. Goode, 188 Ky. 525, 222 S. W. 950 (1920); Doss v. Monticello Blectric
Light and Power Co. & Myers, 193 Ky. 499, 236 S. W. 1046 (1922);
Sale v. Atkins, 206 Ky. 224, 267 S. W. 223 (1924); Thixton v. Palmer,
210 Ky. 838, 276 S. W. 971 (1925); Rauckhorst v. Kraut, 216 Ky. 323,
287 S. W. 895 (1926); Kennedy v. Wolf, 221 Ky. 111, 298 S. W. 188
(1927); Bradley v. Schmidt, 223 Ky. 784, 4 S. W. (2d) 703 (1928);
Malcolm v. Nunn, 226 Ky. 225, 10 S. W. (2d) 817 (1928); Buster v.
Vogel, 227 Ky. 735, 13 S. W. (2d) 1028 (1929); Steel v. Age's Adm'x,
233 Ky. 714, 26 S. W. (2d) 563 (1930); Marsee v. Bates, 235 Ky. 60,
29 S. W. (2d) 632 (1930); Wallace v. Hall, 235 Ky. 749, 32 S. W. (2d)
324 (1930); Craghead v. Halele's Adm'a', 236 Ky. 250, 32 S. W. (2d)
324 (1930); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hall, 237 Ky. 393,
35 S. W. (2d) 550 (1931); Myer's Adm'x v. Brown, 250 Ky. 64, 61 S. W.
(2d) 1052 (1933). The doctrine places liability on the owner of an
automobile, which is purchased and maintained for the pleasure of
his, or her family for negligent injuries inflicted by the vehicle while
it is being used by some member with his consent, express or implied,
on the theory that it is the owner's business to furnish pleasure for the
family. The court has based its decisions mainly on the principal and
agent, and master and servant theory. Stowe v. Morris, supra; Rauck-
horst v. Kraut, supra; Myer's Adm'x v. Brown, supra. It is preferable
to support the doctrine on the relationship of master and servant,
rather than on that of principal and agent, since a principal is liable
only for torts (expressly or impliedly) authorized, while a master is
liable for all torts committed by the servant, while engaged within the
